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In the context of performance optimizations in multitasking, a central debate has unfolded
in multitasking research around whether cognitive processes related to different tasks
proceed only sequentially (one at a time), or can operate in parallel (simultaneously).
This review features a discussion of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence
regarding parallel versus serial task processing in multitasking. In addition, we highlight
how methodological differences and theoretical conceptions determine the extent to
which parallel processing in multitasking can be detected, to guide their employment
in future research. Parallel and serial processing of multiple tasks are not mutually
exclusive. Therefore, questions focusing exclusively on either task-processing mode are
too simplified. We review empirical evidence and demonstrate that shifting between more
parallel and more serial task processing critically depends on the conditions under which
multiple tasks are performed. We conclude that efficient multitasking is reflected by
the ability of individuals to adjust multitasking performance to environmental demands
by flexibly shifting between different processing strategies of multiple task-component
scheduling.
Keywords: multitasking, dual-tasking, crosstalk, psychological refractory period (PRP), cognitive control,
functional bottleneck, bottleneck, parallel versus serial processing
Introduction
A central aim in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience research on multitasking is to
understand and optimize the underlying processes in order to increase efficiency when dealing with
multiple tasks at the same time. Growing demands on information processing due to increasing
multimedia interactions call for higher efficiency. Does the human mind have the structural and
functional means for efficient multitasking? The architectural properties of the nervous system
allow for widely distributed simultaneous neural processing in billions of neurons. However in
multitasking, severe performance costs occur when combining even the simplest cognitive tasks
for simultaneous execution. Based on the current literature, we answer two key questions of
multitasking: (1) What constitutes efficient and adaptive multitasking? (2) Which processes determine
multitasking efficiency?
Most researchers explain typical performance decrements in multitasking with a structural
capacity limitation, a so-called processing bottleneck (e.g., Pashler, 1998), at which certain
cognitive processes proceed serially (i.e., one at a time only). Such a conceptualization of
multitasking excludes the possibility of parallel (i.e., simultaneous) cognitive processing of multiple
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task components1. Others argue that parallel processing is
generally possible (e.g., by means of capacity sharing, Tombu
and Jolicoeur, 2003), but that serial processing reflects the
more efficient and thus primarily pursued multitasking strategy
(e.g., Logan and Gordon, 2001; Miller et al., 2009). In this
review we will outline this debate, specifically focusing on the
characteristics of serial versus parallel processing options and
how they are theoretically conceptualized as well as empirically
assessed in multitasking. For this, we restrict this review on
multitasking situations, in which two speeded choice-reaction
tasks have to be performed at the same time, i.e., dual tasks
(for reviews of sequential multitasking, i.e., task switching,
see Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010). We
will further elaborate on the question of why people pursue
the common aspiration of doing more than one task at a
time (engaging in parallel processing) with the intention of
increasing their performance efficiency, while serial processing
is in fact more efficient. To provide a more complete picture
on the debate of parallel versus serial processing, we will
also discuss under which circumstances adopting a more
parallel processing strategy represents the favorable multitasking
solution.
Capabilities and Limitations of the
Cognitive System for Multitasking
Serial Processing Due to Limited Resources
Performing two or more tasks at the same time typically results in
severe performance costs in terms of increased response latencies
and/or error rates (Welford, 1952; Kahneman, 1973; Pashler,
1994). On a theoretical level, these dual-task costs have often been
explained bymeans of a structural capacity limitation in cognitive
processing. Early work on multitasking, framed within the
information processing theory, assumed that access to this single
processing channel is scheduled sequentially, one task at a time.
For example, when a first task (T1) enters the capacity-limited
processing stage, processing of an additional task (T2) is put to
a halt until T1 critical stage processing is finished (see Figure 1).
Following this logic, serial task scheduling is the consequence
of a capacity-limited processing bottleneck that is structural
in nature (Welford, 1952; Broadbent, 1958). This view of a
structural limitation and a passive bottleneck-scheduling process
is the core assumption of the influential and to date still widely
accepted response-selection bottleneck (RSB) model (Pashler
and Johnston, 1989; Pashler, 1994). Following the stage logic of
cognitive processing (Sternberg, 1969), peripheral processing
stages of two tasks (e.g., perception, motor response) proceed in
parallel. Capacity limitation arises at central processing stages
(e.g., response selection) that do not proceed at the same time (see
1In more detail, serial processing means strict sequential processing of certain
critical (e.g., capacity-demanding) cognitive processes due to the assumed
bottleneck.When a cognitive process A is underway, another cognitive process
B cannot operate at the same time. For the assumption of parallel processing,
however, processes A and B proceed simultaneously (at least to certain
degrees), i.e., in parallel to each other and despite the capacity limitation of
the bottleneck.
Figure 1A, Pashler, 1984; Pashler and Johnston, 1989)2. This view
of a structural capacity limitation for central processing stages
is still prevalent in human cognitive neuroscience and textbook
psychology, most likely due to the observation that even the
simplest and/or highly trained cognitive operations are subject to
substantial processing limitations when combined with another
task (e.g., Levy et al., 2006). However, there is less consensus
about whether this processing bottleneck reflects a structural
(Pashler, 1998) or a strategic (Meyer and Kieras, 1997) limitation.
This theoretical assumption that central-processing limitations
cause dual-task costs has largely been derived from experimental
paradigms in which two choice reaction tasks are presented
with varying temporal intervals (i.e., stimulus onset asynchronies,
SOAs) between the stimulus of T1 (S1) and the stimulus of T2
(S2; e.g., Pashler, 1984; Pashler and Johnston, 1989; Schubert,
1999). The temporal task overlap (and thus dual-task load) can be
experimentally manipulated to examine dual-task costs and thus
to assess themicrostructure of dual-task interference (Pashler and
Johnston, 1989; McCann and Johnston, 1992; Fischer et al., 2007;
see Pashler, 1994, 1998; Meyer and Kieras, 1997, for reviews).
While performance inTask 1 has been assumed to be unaffected
by the manipulation of temporal task overlap, performance in
Task 2 has been hypothesized to critically depend on the temporal
proximity of both tasks (Figure 1A). The larger the temporal
overlap between both tasks (the shorter the SOA between S1
and S2), the slower the responses and higher the error rates
in Task 2. The difference in response time in Task 2 (RT2)
between short and long SOA has been called the psychological
refractory period (PRP) effect (Pashler, 1994; Meyer and Kieras,
1997). The PRP effect reflects a widely used measure of dual-task
costs evolving at the capacity-limited response-selection stage in
dual-tasking (Figure 1A). Importantly, these dual-task costs (i.e.,
performance increments at high temporal task overlap compared
to low temporal task overlap) serve as marker for multitasking
efficiency.
Demonstrating Parallel Processing Under the
Assumption of Limited Resources
Within the PRP paradigm, the assumption of parallel processing
means that central cognitive processing in T2 can proceed
in parallel to central capacity-limited stage processing in T1
(Figures 1B,C). Structural bottleneck models deny the possibility
of central T2 processing during the bottleneck (i.e., the PRP).
Yet, parallel T2 processing during the T1 bottleneck stage has
been demonstrated with two different approaches, yielding to
two distinct result patterns, i.e., the locus of slack logic and the
backward crosstalk logic.
In the locus of slack logic (Pashler and Johnston, 1989;McCann
and Johnston, 1992), the possibility of parallel processing is
assessed in performance measures of T2. For this, the duration
(e.g., difficulty) of a central cognitive process in T2 ismanipulated.
The relationship between easy and difficult conditions and SOA is
2It should be noted that there are alternative conceptions of the bottleneck
theory, that mainly differ in the location of the capacity-limited processing
stages, proposing either motor execution bottlenecks (e.g., Keele, 1973; Ulrich
et al., 2006; Bratzke et al., 2009) or multiple bottlenecks in the information-
processing stream (De Jong, 1993).
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of serial task processing (A) and different forms of parallel processing (B,C) of two tasks in the framework of an
assumed capacity-limited central processing stage. Dashed lines illustrate the changes in result patterns when assuming different forms of parallel processing.
Note that although theoretical models are explained in terms of response time (RT) pattern, the same logic also applies to error rates. (A) Illustration of the
response-selection bottleneck (RSB) model as explanation for severe dual-task processing limitations (Pashler, 1994). Each task consists of different processing
stages (i.e., P, perception; RS, response selection; MR, motor response). Processing in some stages can occur in parallel (in white). Processing of other critical
stages cannot occur simultaneously (shaded), because they rely on the same capacity-limited processing channel. When both tasks overlap substantially (e.g., short
stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA), Task 2 (T2) processing is interrupted, because RS2 processing has to wait until RS1 processing is completed (psychological
refractory period, PRP). At long SOA, no interruption occurs, as critical stages do not overlap. This results in the typical pattern of performance decrements in T2 at
short SOA (high dual-task load) compared to long SOA (low dual-task load). Task 1 (T1) processing is only little affected by temporal task overlap. (B) Crosstalk refers
to the observation that T2 processing impacts on T1 processing, which has been taken as evidence for parallel processing despite an assumed RSB. Crosstalk
effects are typically measured in response latency in T1 (RT1). The impact of T2 processing on central stage processing in T1 can be both beneficial or costly with
decreasing or increasing RT1, respectively (e.g., Koch and Prinz, 2002). Importantly, any influence of T2 processing on T1, shortening or prolonging RT1, will
back-propagate onto T2 (Ferreira and Pashler, 2002; Miller and Reynolds, 2003; Schubert et al., 2008). Changes in RT1 due to crosstalk should thus also be
obtainable in response latency in T2 (RT2). Theoretically, crosstalk effects are not compatible with classical models of a single-channel theory (e.g., RSB model) and
favor explanations in terms of capacity sharing (see C). However, assumptions of serial processing according to the RSB model can be preserved when assuming
that different sub-components of RS2 can operate in parallel. Some authors thus distinguish response activation (RA) processes from more classical
response-selection processes as the basis for interacting central components between two tasks (Hommel, 1998; Lien and Proctor, 2002; Schubert et al., 2008). (C)
Capacity models assume that the central bottleneck is not immutable but flexible. The processing limitation arises, because two central processes require access to
the same cognitive resources. Available resources are divided between the two tasks for the period during which both central stages overlap. The allocation of
resources to the tasks at hand depends on task factors (e.g., instruction, incentives). Extreme forms can mimic a central bottleneck, with 100% resources allocated
to T1 and 0% to T2. The more resources are shared between the two tasks (e.g., 70/30 or 50/50), the higher the RT1 increase and RT2 decrease at short SOA. This
resource allocation is assumed to be realized by mechanisms of cognitive control (for details, see text).
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particularly important in these cases. If no difficulty differences
are obtained at short SOA, an absorption into the bottleneck
(and hence parallel processing during the bottleneck) is assumed.
If the manipulated central process cannot proceed during the
bottleneck, the duration/difficulty manipulation should reveal
additivity with the SOA manipulation. The manipulation should
be visible to the same extent at short and long SOA (for successful
demonstrations of parallel central processing using locus of slack,
see Oriet et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2007; Fischer and Schubert,
2008; Janczyk, 2013).
Backward crosstalk logic is based on the empirical finding that
processing of two tasks rarely occurs independently (Navon and
Miller, 1987). Especially in conditions of high temporal proximity
(i.e., short SOA) and high task similarity (i.e., both tasks share
dimensional overlap), the likelihood of between-task interaction
is increased. Figure 1B illustrates the possibility of this crosstalk.
Central T2 task processing affects central T1 processing prior
to completion of Task 1 bottleneck-stage processing (Duncan,
1979; Navon and Miller, 1987, 2002; Hommel, 1998; Logan and
Schulkind, 2000; Koch and Prinz, 2002;Miller, 2006; Fischer et al.,
2007). As a consequence, any T1 processes subjected to the central
bottleneck are either facilitated or prolonged. In contrast to the
locus of slack logic, evidence for parallel processing based on
crosstalk logic therefore comes frommodulations of performance
measures in T1 caused by central T2 processing.
A seminal study using this logic was provided by Hommel
(1998). In his experiment, participants responded to the color
(red/green) of letters in T1 and to their identity (H/S) in T2.
Crosstalk effects on RT1 were demonstrated when response codes
for both tasks overlapped. More specifically, manual T1 responses
to letter colors (e.g., red-left and green-right response) and verbal
T2 responses to letter identity (e.g., saying left to an H and
right to an S) produced substantial crosstalk interference (RT1
prolongation), when the verbal answer right coincidedwith the left
manual response (response-category mismatch). T2 processing
facilitated T1 response activation (RT1 decrease), when the verbal
answer right was accompanied with the right manual response
(response-category match). S-R translation processes of T1 and
T2 were not serial and discrete but proceeded in parallel, when
dimensional overlap between tasks was provided (see also Logan
and Schulkind, 2000; Koch and Prinz, 2002; Miller and Alderton,
2006; Fischer et al., 2007; Schubert et al., 2008; Janczyk et al.,
2014). This finding of significant central T2 processing during
the PRP challenges single-channel theories of serial processing
(Pashler, 1984). Instead, the observed result pattern is in line
with a capacity sharing assumption. The finding of crosstalk
can however be reconciled with the notion of the RSB model,
when adding a distinction between response activation (RA) and
response identification (RI).While the former features no capacity
limitations, thus allowing for crosstalk, the latter requires all
central resources, causing a bottleneck (Hommel, 1998; Lien and
Proctor, 2002; Schubert et al., 2008).
Further evidence for parallel central processing in dual tasks
comes from electrophysiological studies. Behavioral crosstalk
effects, as reported in Hommel (1998), are accompanied by
deflections in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) in T2,
reflecting T2 RA processes that start prior to completion of
central bottleneck processing in T1 (Lien et al., 2007). Similarly,
measuring the LRP during T1 processing, Ko and Miller (2014)
showed that the time between S1 onset and onset of the stimulus-
locked LRP was modulated by central T2 processing, thus
providing further evidence for parallel central T2 processing.
Parallel Processing Without the Assumption of
Limited Resources
The strict notion of limited resources and the consequential
serial processing has been questioned on both experimental and
theoretical grounds. It can be traced back to early attentional-filter
conceptions of Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) and the assumption
of multiple specialized resources (Norman and Bobrow, 1975;
Wickens, 1984; but see Allport, 1980).
Early work in the 1970s identified factors such as task similarity
and task practice that crucially determine the possibility of parallel
task processing. For example, Allport et al. (1972) argued that
dual-task costs do not result from exceeding the capacity of a
single-channel processor but from the difficulty of separating
two similar tasks. When combining two highly dissimilar tasks
(e.g., repeating continuous speech and sight-reading difficult
piano music), piano players were able to demonstrate parallel
processing of both tasks with a quality comparable to single-task
processing (Allport et al., 1972; see also Shaffer, 1975; Wickens,
1984). Similarly, Shaffer (1975) showed that participants skilled in
typewriting can easily perform copy-typing (typing from a sheet)
with a verbal shadowing task in parallel, but fail in combining
an audio-typing task with reading from a sheet (for more recent
research on the role of modality pairings when determining dual-
task costs, see Stelzel et al., 2005; Hazeltine and Ruthruff, 2006;
Hazeltine et al., 2006; Huestegge and Koch, 2013; Halvorson
and Hazeltine, 2015). Although the aforementioned early studies
revealed impressive capabilities in multitasking, many of these
studies have been criticized, because their task timing allowed
for fast switches between task-component processing (e.g.,
multiplexing). It is thus conceivable that the results only mimic
parallel processing instead of actually representing it.
Another demonstration of parallel processing was achieved
by administering a large amount of dual-task practice. Spelke
et al. (1976) trained two participants to read short stories, while
writing lists of words at dictation. Training took part over a
period of 17 weeks (with five 1-h sessions per week). After
the training, dual-task performance approached the quality of
individual single-task performance. Because people easily develop
skills through practice, the authors postulated that the potential of
skill acquisition in any domainmight question the general concept
of limited cognitive capacity. In 2001, the assumption of parallel
processing by extensive practice received a revival, mainly due to
the implementation of timing- and interference-controlled dual-
task paradigms. In an influential study, Schumacher et al. (2001)
presented two choice reaction tasks (e.g., a visual-manual and an
auditory-vocal task) simultaneously (SOA= 0ms) and with equal
task priority. Multitasking efficiency was captured in the extent to
which performing each task in a dual-task context equals single-
task performance. The criterion of perfect time sharing (dual-task
performance equals single-task performance) was achieved after
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only five practice sessions (see also Ruthruff et al., 2001; Hazeltine
et al., 2002; Oberauer and Kliegl, 2004; Liepelt et al., 2011a,b;
Strobach et al., 2012). Proponents of the RSB model however
argued that practice leads to shortening of processing stages
which, in turn, reduces the effects of the bottleneck instead of
bypassing it (e.g., latent bottleneck assumptions, see, e.g., Ruthruff
et al., 2003; Dux et al., 2009).
Theoretical Models Allowing for Parallel
Processing
Resource models represent a major group of theoretical models
that allow for the possibility of parallel task processing. In line
with single-channel theories, they also assume a strict capacity
limitation in central cognitive processing. In contrast to the
RSB model however, they incorporate the idea that the available
somewhat limited resources can be scheduled and allocated to
specific task processing (Kahneman, 1973; Norman and Bobrow,
1975). An extension of the assumption of an unspecific central
resource (Kahneman, 1973) is the idea of multiple specific
resources (Wickens, 1984, 2002). Under the assumption of
multiple resources, parallel processing can occur, for example, if
task components are scheduled in different processing threads
that are coordinated and scheduled by different resources (e.g.,
Salvucci and Taatgen, 2008).
According to resource models, dual-task costs arise, because
processing of different task components requires the same limited
resources (Kahneman, 1973; Navon and Miller, 2002; Tombu
and Jolicoeur, 2003). In these cases, resources are allocated in
an all or none fashion. The classical PRP effect would reflect an
extreme form of resource sharing of 100% of resources to T1
and 0% to T2, mimicking a capacity-limited central processing
bottleneck due to the instruction of T1 priority. In contrast to
RSB models, limited processing resources can however be shared
between two tasks in varying proportions (e.g., 80% T1 and 20%
T2). The more resources are shared, the more parallel processing
occurs. With this logic, capacity-sharing models incorporate the
central bottleneck assumption (Navon and Miller, 2002; Tombu
and Jolicoeur, 2002, 2003; Lehle and Hübner, 2009) and account
for often observed findings of between-task crosstalk in PRP-like
paradigms (Hommel, 1998; Logan and Schulkind, 2000; Koch and
Prinz, 2002; Miller, 2006; Fischer et al., 2007; Schubert et al., 2008;
Koch, 2009).
The proposition of a flexible allocation of resources requires a
definition of how attentional resources are distributed. Arguments
have been made that the allocation of attentional resources is not
incidental but depends on instructions (Lehle and Hübner, 2009;
Lehle et al., 2009), task priority, and outcome value (Wickens et al.,
2003). It reflects strategic resource scheduling, typically realized
by cognitive control processes (Meyer andKieras, 1997; Logan and
Gordon, 2001; Sigman and Dehaene, 2006). The assumption of
strategic and flexible allocation of processing capacity is supported
by recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) findings
indicating that brain areas associated with cognitive control are
activated during dual-tasking (e.g., Szameitat et al., 2002; Marois
and Ivanoff, 2005; Dux et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2009; Tombu
et al., 2011). In addition, a recent fMRI study adopting a dual-task
paradigm introduced by Miller et al. (2009) to create conditions
of more serial versus more parallel task processing (for details,
see below) provided evidence for distinct neuroanatomical
correlates of response selection depending on task-processing
constraints. In more detail, under conditions of increased parallel
task processing response selection mechanisms operated at the
striatal level, whereas under conditions of increased serial task
processing response selection was accompanied by primarily
lateral prefrontal cortex activation (Yildiz and Beste, 2014).
Theories that postulate the involvement of cognitive control
functions to explain limitations in multitasking do not necessarily
feature assumptions of general limited resources. Multitasking
limitations occur due to competing processes that require access
to the same local and task-specific resources (Navon and Gopher,
1979). This notion is important, because instead of indicating
structural constraints of limited capacity, the observed limitations
reflect functional constraints (e.g., computational limitation).
Functional constraints arise, when the same representation is
used “for different purposes by multiple processes” (Feng et al.,
2014, p. 130). For example, in cognitive control theories of dual
tasking such as the executive control of visual attention (ECTVA)
theory (Logan and Gordon, 2001), the observation of serial task
processing results from the effort to avoid interactions between
multiple task-component processing (e.g., between stimulus-
response bindings). This has been formulated in terms of the
dual-task binding problem that describes the challenge to correctly
map stimuli of each task (S1 and S2) onto the correct responses
in each task (R1 and R2 for Task 1 and Task 2, respectively). To
solve the binding problem and therefore to minimize the risk of
response reversals and/or confusion, a strategy of serial processing
is adopted (Logan and Gordon, 2001). The cognitive system
can flexibly respond to requirements of the dual-task situation
(Meyer and Kieras, 1997) by adopting a sequential processing
strategy, if the risk of task reversals is high. As a consequence,
serial processing of two tasks appears to be the more efficient
processing strategy in general (Logan and Gordon, 2001; Miller
et al., 2009) with the functionality of reducing between-task
interference (Navon and Miller, 1987; Logan and Gordon, 2001;
Tombu and Jolicoeur, 2003; Lehle and Hübner, 2009; Oberauer
and Bialkova, 2011). Choosing a serial processing mode thus
reflects a functional and strategic option (see also Hazeltine et al.,
2008).
Why Do Individuals Employ a Parallel
Task-Processing Mode in the Face of
Increased Between-Task Interference?
We have established that individuals are able to adopt a strategy of
parallel task-component processing when performing more than
one task at a time. Given that parallel processing is associated with
increased risks of between-task interference and is less efficient,
why should participants opt for this processing strategy in the first
place? Miller et al. (2009) provided a first answer to this question
by showing that parallel processing has the means to outperform
serial processing in terms of dual-task efficiency. They defined
dual-task efficiency as the total time that it takes to complete two
tasks (RT1+RT2= total reaction time, TRT). In two experiments,
the PRP logic with two independent tasks was applied and the
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ratio of short to long SOA was varied in a list-wide proportion-
SOA manipulation, i.e., participants performed lists with mostly
short SOAs and lists with mostly long SOAs. The authors not
only showed that lists with mostly short SOAs produced typical
result patterns of parallel processing (i.e., increased RT1 and
decreased RT2, Figure 1C) but also revealed that list-wide SOA
manipulations determined the efficiency of parallel and serial
processing modes. Importantly, in lists with mostly short SOAs
parallel processing turned out to be more efficient than serial
processing. In typical PRP paradigms the temporal proximity
between tasks (SOAs) is rather balanced. Thus, a serial processing
strategy would seem favorable there.
Another reason for the fact that we mostly observe serial
processing when testing participants with typical PRP-like dual-
task paradigms in our laboratories is the strong T1 priority
instruction. Strong emphasis on T1 performance favors a
resource allocation that primarily or even entirely benefits T1
processing (e.g., 100% of available resources are allocated onto
T1). Accordingly, result patterns that speak for serial processing
are not surprising. Yet, when specific priority instructions are
lifted, participants freely choose a moderate parallel processing
strategy (Lehle andHübner, 2009), resulting in increased crosstalk
between tasks (Figure 1B). An explanation of why participants
may adopt a less efficient processing mode was put forward
by Lehle et al. (2009), showing that parallel processing is
associated with less mental effort, as confirmed by reduced
levels of peripheral physiological measures and subjective effort
ratings in parallel compared to more serial processing. Therefore,
although parallel processing is not the most efficient way
of dual-task processing (in most cases), it seems to reflect
a less effortful processing strategy compared to strict serial
processing. Given the choice, participants seem to adopt the
processing mode of least mental effort (Hull, 1943; Kool et al.,
2010).
Shifting Between Parallel and Serial
Processing Modes as Marker of Adaptive
Behavior
Even though the question of whether and to what extent parallel
task processing is possible in dual-task performance is frequently
discussed in the literature (Han and Marois, 2013), it might not
be what we cognitive psychologists need to ask ourselves in this
context. Instead, in our opinion, two key questions to guide
current discussions and future research efforts result from the
work as summarized above: (1) How is the shift between these
complementary dual-task processing modes realized? (2) Under
which conditions are parallel and serial processing themore adaptive
and thus favorable choice? As a reply to the first question, we
propose that optimized and efficient multitasking reflects the
ability to flexibly adopt an either parallel or serial task-processing
mode, depending on situational demands. Multitasking requires
an individual to maintain a balance between two antagonistic
types of performance optimization, i.e., minimizing between-task
interference (by increasing serial task processing) andminimizing
mental effort (by allowing for more parallel processing). Flexibly
adjusting the degree of more serial versus more parallel dual-task
processing to changing task and context requirements reflects
high levels of adaptability in dynamic environments including
the online analysis of contextual features, their translation
into performance requirements, implementation of the optimal
processing mode, and continuous monitoring of both the
environmental demands and performance outcome as basis for
further tuning, where required (Goschke, 2013; Fischer et al.,
2014).
Raising the question as to whether participants can top-
down control their multitasking processing mode, recent
studies provide evidence that individuals are able to implement
substantial block-by-block switches between more parallel and
more serial task-processing modes while continuing to perform
the same task when instructed to do so (Lehle and Hübner,
2009). In the framework of ECTVA (Logan and Gordon, 2001),
instructions are assumed to define a set of cognitive control
parameters (e.g., task priority, attentional breath, etc.) which,
applied to a dual-task context, means that they determine the
degree of serial versus parallel processing. On the cognitive
process level, the extent of serial task processing might be then
translated into two aspects, i.e., (a) the prioritization of Task 1
processing (Stelzel et al., 2009) and (b) a temporary inhibition of
additional Task 2 processing (Koch et al., 2010).
In addition to the top-down regulation, there is evidence
for context-driven shifts between more parallel versus more
serial dual-task processing. For example, the aforementioned
expectation of the temporal overlap between two tasks (Miller
et al., 2009) and task difficulty determine the degree of parallel
versus serial task processing (e.g., task difficulty induces a bias
toward increased serial dual-task processing which is reflected
in steeper RT2 declines with increasing SOA; Luria and Meiran,
2005; Fischer et al., 2007). Recently, we also provided evidence
for a complete bottom-up adjustment of parallel versus serial
processing (Fischer et al., 2014). Using a crosstalk approach
(Figure 1B), we tested whether participants are able to extract
statistical contingencies (i.e., the probability of between-task
interference) from the task context and use this information
to adjust the amount of parallel versus serial task processing.
More specifically, dual-task conditions with high risks of crosstalk
interference (80% crosstalk interference trials) and dual-task
conditions with low risks of crosstalk interference (20% crosstalk
interference trials) were presented at distinguished locations on
the screen. Although overall likelihood of crosstalk interference
was 50/50, participants were able to adjust the strength of task
shielding (by means of increased serial processing) in a location-
specific manner. The extent of serial processing was significantly
increased for the location with high likelihood of crosstalk
interference, which resulted in reduced crosstalk for trials at that
location. In trials presented at the location with low interference
likelihood, shielding was reduced and higher levels of parallel
processing were observed. Therefore, if a context requires more
protection of T1 processing from T2 influences, task shielding is
increased, resulting in less parallel processing.
Studying impacting factors of additional task performance
on prioritized motor movements, we demonstrated that the
preceding trial history (i.e., conflict between tasks in the previous
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trial) influences the balance between parallel and serial task
processing (Scherbaum et al., 2015). Using continuous motor-
execution tasks (i.e., mouse movements in both tasks), we showed
that large amounts of crosstalk interference during the previous
trial (N-1) resulted in the adoption of a more serial task-
processing mode, as evidenced by reduced crosstalk interference
in Trial N. Such sequential modulations are typically accounted
for by response conflicts triggering the recruitment of cognitive
control (Gratton et al., 1992; Botvinick et al., 2001). In the dual-
task context, this reflects a bias toward increased serial task
processing to reduce crosstalk interference.
We further demonstrated that the balance between
complementary dual-task processing modes is determined by
internal situational features such as variations in an individual’s
mood, task-preceding cognitive control state, or acute stress
levels. First, we administered a mood-induction procedure (with
controlled arousal effects) prior to a dual task with crosstalk.
Participants that underwent a negative mood-induction protocol
displayed higher levels of serial task processing (e.g., less
between-task interference) than participants that underwent
positive mood induction (Zwosta et al., 2013). Second, we
manipulated the level of parallel versus serial processing by
activating different cognitive control states prior to dual-task
performance (Fischer and Hommel, 2012). Participants solved
different types of creativity tasks associated with either cognitive
flexibility (i.e., divergent thinking) or cognitive persistence
(i.e., convergent thinking) prior to the dual-task session. In the
convergent-thinking group, participants performed an adapted
version of the remote association test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), in
the divergent-thinking group, participants performed a version
of the alternative uses task (AUT; Guilford, 1967) in order to
induce convergent versus divergent thinking, respectively. The
convergent-thinking group displayed stronger serial processing
to reduce between-task interference compared to both divergent-
thinking and control group. Third, we investigated the effect
of acute stress on dual-task processing modes. Following an
acute psychosocial stressor (Trier Social Stress Test), participants
adopted a more resource-saving processing strategy of increased
parallel processing compared to controls without the stress
experience (Plessow et al., 2012). Stressed participants allowed
for increased levels of between-task interference, presumably
because a strict sequential and serial scheduling of task processing
would be too effortful and resource-demanding. We interpreted
our finding as a sacrificing and compensatory strategy in order
to maintain overall high dual-task performance. The notion that
parallel processing reflects a more resource-saving processing
mode and is mentally less demanding (Lehle et al., 2009) fits
nicely with our observation of compensatory cognitive strategy
changes as a result of acute stress experience. Using a different
dual-task paradigm consisting of two independent tasks without
the possibility of between-task interactions, stress-related
compensatory strategy shifts entailed an increased T1 priority
focus, speeding T1 component processing and, as a result,
reducing critical bottleneck stage processing (Beste et al., 2013).
These examples illustrate that the adoption of a more parallel
or a more serial task-processing mode largely depends on the
conditions under which multiple tasks are performed. With
this, the situation-dependent implementation of complementary
task-processing modes in multitasking can be integrated into a
general framework posting the regulation of cognitive control
as fundamental basis underlying adaptive goal-directed behavior
(Cohen et al., 2004, 2007; Goschke, 2013). Adaptive action control
requires the dynamic adjustment between complementary control
demands. While task-irrelevant stimuli need to be ignored and
blocked from being processed in order to prevent interference
with task-relevant processing (goal shielding), complete shielding
is dysfunctional and even potentially harmful, as it would
prevent the individual from monitoring the environment for
potentially relevant stimuli (background monitoring) that may
signal a change in action goal (e.g., stimuli that imply danger).
Instead, a dynamic regulation of these complementary control
processes is required, reflecting a tradeoff between antagonistic
constraints (see Goschke, 2003, 2013; Goschke and Bolte, 2014,
for an overview). Such “control dilemmas” describe the need
to be continuously and flexibly adjusted based on (changing)
environmental demands (Goschke, 2003; Cohen et al., 2004,
2007). A recent argument is that dysfunctional control parameter
settings in terms of sustained biases toward one particular (often
extreme) control state might represent an endophenotype of a
variety of mental disorders (e.g., Goschke, 2014).
Such extreme biases and their behavioral consequences have
been primarily investigated in healthy populations. For example,
an experimentally induced bias toward high stability comes at
the cost of reduced cognitive flexibility (Dreisbach and Goschke,
2004; Plessow et al., 2011; Fischer and Hommel, 2012), which,
if maintained, might not only turn out to be dysfunctional in
situations calling for cognitive flexibility but additionally manifest
in overall cognitive rigidity and compulsive behavior (Meiran
et al., 2011). A key future scientific endeavor will be to determine
the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the flexible adoption of
complementary task-processing modes in general.
Applying this framework, multitasking in itself constitutes
a prime control dilemma, in which a crosstalk-avoiding serial
processing strategy counters an effort-saving parallel processing
strategy. Complete T1 shielding and thus T2 blocking is
dysfunctional, as successful multitasking requires the attendance
and processing of T2 components. Yet, the efficiency of adaptive
multitasking might be seen in the flexible selection of a situation-
adequate processing strategy within a continuum from serial
to parallel task processing. Such a conception also has direct
consequences for defining efficient multitasking, and it raises the
question of how to optimize the flexible and context-sensitive
adoption of complementary task-processing modes.
We would like to conclude this discussion about parallel
and serial processing in multitasking by emphasizing that the
inclusion of closely related topics into further investigations
of multitasking will be crucial as additional source to inform
our understanding of efficient multitasking and its underlying
cognitive processes. First of all, incorporating an individual
difference perspective on multitasking ability in general and the
adaptive adjustment of task-processing strategies in particular
might hold promise for gaining novel insights into factors of
optimized multitasking performance. For example, individuals
frequently engaging in multitasking are not necessarily the ones
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displaying efficient multitasking performance (Ophir et al.,
2009; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013). In fact, multitasking activity
correlated negatively with multitasking ability but positively
with impulsiveness and sensation seeking (Sanbonmatsu et al.,
2013). Individuals that frequently multitask (e.g., heavy media
multitaskers) are more easily distracted by irrelevant information
and less able to focus on a single goal (Ophir et al., 2009).
In the context of the outlined discussion, this behavior can
be framed as a task-processing bias continuously tuned toward
heightened levels of parallel processing. Another promising
finding in individual differences in multitasking abilities that
warrants further investigation is the detection of “supertaskers,”
i.e., individuals who do not show performance decrements in
multitasking compared to single-task performance (Watson and
Strayer, 2010). Their ability has been explained in terms of a more
efficient recruitment of cognitive control and an increased ability
to maintain and coordinate multiple goals and limitations in
information processing, enabling supertaskers to more effectively
deal with situations of heightened cognitive load (Medeiros-Ward
et al., 2014).
Secondly, research contrasting tentative processes underlying
multitasking with analogous processes in related fields of the
study of attentional limitations, e.g., to more clearly determine
at which points more serial and more parallel task processing
are more adaptive and efficient (see, for example Miller et al.,
2009). To illustrate this point, unified bottleneck theories propose
close similarities between attentional limitations in sensory
consolidation as in the attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992)
and attentional limitations in response selection as in the PRP
paradigm (Tombu et al., 2011; Marti et al., 2012; Garner et al.,
2014). Yet, while PRP research often aims at optimizing dual-task
performance by increasing the engagement of cognitive control
(e.g., through an emphasis on speed plus reward), it has been
shown that limitations in the attentional blink arise from an
overinvestment of cognitive control (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis,
2006; Taatgen et al., 2009). Therefore, future research is needed to
determine whether strategies of increasing versus decreasing the
engagement of cognitive controlmight be promising when aiming
at reducing dual-task costs in standard training protocols.
Thirdly, an important question to guide future research
in this area is in which respect the ability to flexibly adopt
complementary task-processing modes is related to fluid
intelligence, further specifying the currently investigated
link between core executive control competencies and fluid
intelligence as well as flexible adaptation to environmental
changes as a hallmark of fluid intelligence (Duncan et al., 2008;
Jaeggi et al., 2008; Duncan, 2010; Diamond, 2013; Au et al., 2015).
Conclusion
Starting from the question of what constitutes adaptive
multitasking performance, we reviewed empirical evidence for
two processing modes in multitasking that are not mutually
exclusive, i.e., serial versus parallel task-component processing.
Demonstrating that parallel task processing is indeed possible
when performing more than one task at a time has challenged the
view that the frequently observed multitasking costs represent
an inevitable consequence of a structural capacity limitation.
Instead, it suggests that these multitasking costs may signal a
functional limitation (e.g., with the purpose of avoiding crosstalk).
In the second part of the review, we highlighted that evidence
for parallel processing critically depends on the theoretical and
methodological basis under which multitasking performance is
assessed.
While serial task processing appears to be the most efficient
multitasking processing strategy, participants are able to adopt
parallel processing. Moreover, parallel processing can even
outperform serial processing under certain conditions. Based
on these highlighted insights into multitasking performance,
future research aiming to further understand the nature of
parallel versus serial processing of multiple tasks to unveil the
secrets of multitasking efficiency needs to take into account
the preconditions and environmental constraints under which
multitasking is performed. We believe that a flexible and
context-sensitive recruitment of a more serial or more parallel
processing strategy enables the agent to flexibly adjust to
environmental demands, providing important mechanisms for
adaptive intelligent behavior (Cohen et al., 2004, 2007; Goschke,
2013).
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